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                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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    SHERRILL FOSTER, HOWARD FOSTER,
                                               ) No.
                                                      C-07-5445-WHA
    SHEILA BURTON, and MINNIE BURTON,
                                               )
                                               ) OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO
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           Plaintiffs,
                                               ) DISMISS AND TO MOTION FOR MORE
                                               ) DEFINITE STATEMENT
12
    v.
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                                               ) [Jury Trial Demanded]
    SHANNON EDMONDS, LORI TYLER,
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    COUNTY OF LAKE, CITY OF CLEARLAKE, ) Date:
                                                             May 22, 2008
    and DOES 1-100,
                                               ) Time:
                                                             8:00 a.m.
15
                                               ) Honorable William H. Alsup
           Defendants.
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    Foster, et al., v. Edmonds, et al. (No. C-07-5445-WHA)
                                                                                  P021.OPP
    OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO
                                            - 1 -
    MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
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I. INTRODUCTION

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On the early morning of December 7, 2005, Defendant Shannon Edmonds shot and killed two young men, in the back, as they ran across the street from the house in which Edmonds resided and which he co-owned with Defendant Lori Tyler in the City of Clearlake, County of Lake. Those two, young men are Christian Foster and Rashad Williams, and they were hit

initially by Edmonds' fusillade far away from that house at 2922 11th Street in Clearlake.

Some believe Foster and Williams were at the 11th Street property to purchase marijuana, one of the several recreational drugs Edmonds distributed or dealt from his home. Edmonds himself has not been charged with a single crime in connection with the distribution of illegal drugs and the murders of Foster and Williams. Instead, Renato Hughes is being prosecuted by Lake County for the murders of Foster and Williams; though Edmonds never saw Hughes the night in question, Hughes was near the 11th Street house at the time Edmonds admittedly gunned down Foster and Williams. Foster, Williams, and Hughes are black; Edmonds is white.

The criminal case against Hughes continues to receive scrutiny from the media. Lake County is prosecuting Hughes under the "provocative act" theory. It bears repeating: Despite the fact that Hughes was nowhere near the area where a fight allegedly took place, Hughes faces two felony murder charges; and, Lake County is not prosecuting Edmonds for any crime. Jon Hopkins, Lake County District Attorney, emphatically refuses to file charges against Edmonds.

Because the murder case against Hughes delayed receipt of critical data, meaningful information has been slow to come by in this civil case. However, the successors in interest to

The elements of the 'provocative act' murder are found in *People v. Gilbert* (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690 [revd. on other grounds (1967) 388 U.S. 263]: "When the defendant or his accomplice, with a conscious disregard for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable response to such act, the defendant is guilty of murder."

Foster and Williams, the plaintiffs here, filed this action October 24, 2007.² They amended their complaint on December 7, 2007, with the filing of the first amended complaint (FAC).

Defendants Lake County and Clearlake move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6). Clearlake also seeks a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).

The motions should be denied, except as addressed below with regard to the state law claims against these two entities and the Ninth Amendment claim. If the Court grants motions as to the federal claims, Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend; defects may be easily cured.³

II. DISCUSSION AND OPPOSITION

Under FRCP, Rule 8(a), Plaintiffs' complaint must provide "fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. *See, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA*, (2002) 534 US 506, 514. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Dismissal is proper only where the facts alleged fail to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. All well pled facts in the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts must be in Plaintiffs' favor. *See, e.g., Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 542 F.2d 466, 468-469 (8th Cir. 1976).

A. The State Law Claims Against These Two Defendants Should Be Dismissed.

Lake County and Clearlake are correct: Plaintiffs failed properly to plead compliance with the California Claims Act in the FAC. While Plaintiffs did in fact comply with the CCA, more than six months passed following rejection of those claims before October 24, 2007.

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Plaintiffs are the mother and father of Christian Foster, Sherrill Foster and Howard Foster; and, the mother and grandmother of Rashad Williams, Sheila Burton and Minnie Burton. They sue here as successors in interest and in their representative capacities. *See, e.g., Byrd v. Guess,* 137 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiffs oppose based on the May 22, 2008, hearing date. There was a stipulation circulating to continue the hearing date and base all filing deadlines on the new date; however, Defendants appear to have abandoned their desire to move the May 22nd date.

Thus, even if the Court permitted leave to amend to allege compliance, such an amendment would only delay the inevitable. The State law claims thus survive as to the private actors but not as to the municipal actors and agencies.

B. The Federal Claims Should Not Be Dismissed.

Plaintiffs have sued under 42 USC section 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit against persons who, under color of state law, have caused them to be "depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. §1983. In order to state a claim under §1983, Plaintiffs must allege (1) that the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. *See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn*, (1982) 457 U.S. 830, 835, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2768; *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912.

A private individual may be subject to liability under this section if he or she willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the deprivation of the federal right. *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, (1970) 398 U.S. 144, 150-152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604-1605. "Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of the statute." *Id.* [citation]. Conversely, a state actor may be subject to liability for an action physically undertaken by private actors in violation of the plaintiffs' liberty or property rights if the state actor directed or aided and abetted the violation. *See, e.g., Fries v. Barnes*, 618 F.2d 988, 991 (2d Cir. 1980). A physical beating by one who has no privilege of inflicting such corporeal punishment intrudes on the victim's liberty interests. *See. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright*, (1977) 430 U.S. 651, 672-74, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413-14.

Here, as seen in the FAC and demonstrated below, pursuant to official customs and practices with Clearlake and Lake County, Edmonds' illegal activities were allowed, promoted,

and protected by local law enforcement. The murders of Foster and Williams was caused by these acts; the failures by local law enforcement to move against Edmonds sooner allowed him to engage in continued activity and emboldened him to such an extent that the murders of Foster and Williams were foreseeable and likely to occur.

While perhaps not stated well in the FAC, civil rights claims against the municipalities and their personnel arise here essentially from two types of activity. One type is the active assistance given to Edmonds by local law enforcement in furthering the crimes of illegal drug distribution. Investigation has uncovered the use by Edmonds of minors to sell drugs to other minors, activity which Lake County and Clearlake knew about and did nothing about *before* December 7, 2005.

The assistance given to Edmonds involves protection by members of the Clearlake Police Department; and, by Lake County's District Attorney and Sheriff Departments. While the investigation still is in its infancy, the peeling away of layer upon layer has started to reveal active participation by local law enforcement in Edmonds' activities from the 11th Street property, again *before* December 7, 2005.

Of course, after December 7, 2005, Edmonds has been protected and coddled by Lake County. Hopkins refuses to prosecute Edmonds in connection with the twin murders of Foster and Williams, who both were shot in the back, across the street from Edmonds' home.

Hopkins also refuses to prosecute Edmonds for two subsequent felonies, neither of which directly involve the sale and distribution of illegal narcotics. One such crime is the attempted murder of Tyler, which took place in August 2007. According to *Tyler*, Edmonds – who has also been accused of beating Tyler before and after December 7, 2005, but never prosecuted – forced Tyler to swallow numerous pills in an effort to kill Tyler, or force her to commit suicide. It is undisputed a case was never filed against Edmonds for this attempted murder; Plaintiffs are

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informed and believe Clearlake Police refused to arrest Edmonds despite Tyler's accusations.

Then there is the destruction of evidence at the murder scene following the December 7, 2005, double homicide. Members of the Clearlake Police Department, Lake County Sheriff Department, and Office of the District Attorney all allowed large amounts of illegal drugs to be removed from the 11th Street house and either destroyed or hidden. A trailer on the property was not searched and Defendants again allowed critical evidence to be secreted away.

Despite what has been portrayed as a massive and detailed search of Edmonds' home by law enforcement following the two murders, weapons were never found. Then, many days following December 7, 2005, Edmonds was allowed to return to his house and, within seconds mysteriously was able to locate a tool allegedly used by Foster or Williams in the ostensible attack on the night in question.

In one case, Erin Delew died when her bicycle was struck by a vehicle driven by Janet Kathleen Wagner. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") and Nevada Highway Patrol ("NHP") ultimately found that Janet Kathleen Wagner was not the cause of Erin Rae Delew's death. Delews' heirs were not convinced. They alleged that Wagner, whose husband is an LVMPD officer, and certain other LVMPD and NHP officers, covered-up and conspired to cover-up the true facts surrounding Erin Rae Delews death in violation of the Delews' constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the trial court, held as follows:

The Delews have indeed alleged a constitutional violation, namely, that the defendants violated the Delews' right of meaningful access to the courts by covering up the true facts surrounding Erin Rae Delew's death. The Supreme Court held long ago that the right of access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. [Citation] More recently, the Sixth Circuit held that the Constitution guarantees plaintiffs the right of meaningful access to the courts, the denial of which is established where a party engages in prefiling actions which effectively covers-up evidence and actually renders any state court remedies ineffective. See Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 690 (1998). . . .

As Plaintiffs' state claims here, against these defendants, were thus rendered.

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To prevail on their claim, the Delews must demonstrate that the defendants cover-up
violated their right of access to the courts The district court additionally erred by
holding that the Delews' conspiracy cover-up claim failed to state a claim for relief. In
support of their conspiracy claim, the Delews allege that Janet Kathleen Wagner left the
accident scene during the investigation and that the LVMPD and NHP officers permitted
Wagner to do so. Construing these facts in a light most favorable to the Delews, it is
reasonable to infer an understanding between Wagner and the officers to cover-up the
true facts of Erin Rae Delew's death and thereby deprive the Delews of their right of
access to the courts. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (to
satisfy color of state law requirement under civil conspiracy theory, plaintiff need only
have shown that there was an understanding between civilian and officers to deprive
plaintiff of her rights) <i>Delew v. Wagner</i> , 143 F.3d 1219, 1222-1223 (9 th Cir. 1998).

Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness

9 requirement of the Fourth Amendment. *Tennessee v. Garner*, (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct.

1694. The nature and the quality of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests must be

balanced against countervailing governmental interests. *Id.* at 8, 105 S.Ct. at 1699; *United States*

v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983). "[T]he 'reasonableness' inquiry in an

excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are

'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard

to their underlying intent or motivation.". Graham v. Connor, (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 396-397, 109

S.Ct. 1865, 1872; see, also, Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1102,

Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 334, 343.

This inquiry, of whether the suspect posed "a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer" or to others is usually a question of fact for the jury. *Sloman v. Tadlock*, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994); *Hopkins v. Andaya*, 958 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1992).

While the person who claims excessive force was directed at him or her can only raise a fourth amendment claim, as can successors in interest, parents claiming loss of companionship and society of his or her child raise a different constitutional claim. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in

the companionship and society of his or her child. *See, Strandberg v. City of Helena*, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986); *Kelson v. City of Springfield*, 767 F.2d 651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985).

Thus, Plaintiffs here have pled claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. References to the Ninth Amendment in the FAC are incorrect.

C. The Request For More Definite Statement Should Be Denied.

Somewhere, somehow over the past few years defendants in civil rights cases began arguing for a heightened pleading standard. Though that standard had been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in all but rare cases, and though many such defendants do not refer to a "heightened pleading standard," the truth is that it is such a standard sought to be enforced.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts not to impose heightened standards in the absence of an explicit requirement in a statute or federal rule. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., (2002) 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992 [rejecting heightened pleading standard for Title VII employment discrimination suits]; and, Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, (1993) 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160 [rejecting heightened pleading standard for §1983 suits asserting municipal liability].

A motion under FRCP Rule 12(e), for a more definite statement, cannot be a substitute for the discovery process in view of the liberal notice pleading standard and the availability of extensive discovery. *See, Frederick v. Kozial,* (ED Va. 199) 727 F.Supp. 1019, 1020-1021. Rule 12(e) is designed to reach unintelligibility, not lack of detail. *See, Scarbrough v. R-Way Furniture Co.,* (ED Wis. 1985) 105 FRD 90, 91. The defense appears to seek additional detail despite the liberal pleading standards of the Federal Rules. Thus, the motion under Rule 12(e) should be denied. Plaintiffs have given notice of the nature of the claims against Defendants.

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If The Court Grants The Motion To Dismiss The Federal Claims As To

These Municipal Defendants, Leave To Amend Should Be Granted.

Plaintiffs should be permitted leave to amend if the Court (a) finds that Plaintiffs need

additional facts to state claims upon which relief may be granted, and (b) grants the motions

under Rule 12(b)(6). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to

(9th Cir.1999). "Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, . . ., that the

complaint could not be saved by any amendment." Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d

1246, 1258 (9th Cir. 2007). As illustrated above, Plaintiffs are able to state claims federal law;

supported, protected, and coddled by local law enforcement. The two murders were the natural

certain state remedies. These municipal entities and actors aided and abetted the killer with a

cover-up and other acts designed to thwart and to frustrate the Plaintiffs. The killer continues to

The motions should be denied, except as outlined above. If granted, leave to amend

A private actor killed two men, through the use of excessive force. That actor had been

After the double homicide, law enforcement destroyed the survivors' ability to pursue

amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." See, Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 757

facts in support of their claims may be stated.

and foreseeable result of this cozy and unholy alliance.

should be given. Any defects are easily cured.

receive protection from his friend and allies in law enforcement.

CONCLUSION

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/s/Russell A. Robinson

Russell A. Robinson By:

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Counsel for Plaintiffs

SHERRILL FOSTER, HOWARD FOSTER, SHEILA

BURTON, and MINNIE BURTON

Foster, et al., v. Edmonds, et al. (No. C-07-5445-WHA) OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

Date: May 1, 2008